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Abstract: In tax behavior research, “slippery slope” framework represents an important instrument of assessing 
compliance, based on its two dimensions: trust in authorities (citizens’ perceptions regarding authorities’ disposition 
to work for the sake, safety and benefit of people) and power of authorities (authorities’ ability to chase, catch and 
punish evaders).  The increase/decrease of trust and power  as well as their interlacement engender the type of 
compliance, i.e., voluntary or enforced, and ultimately the profile of the interaction climate between taxpayers and 
authorities. In this paper we explain taxpayers’ trust in authorities and their perceptions of authorities’ power with 
the help of socio-economic, financial, political, psychological proxies in eastern and southern Asian jurisdictions 
like China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Japan, Republic of Korea and Pakistan. For this purpose, we tackle several 
aspects,  such  as  political  regime,  voice  and  accountability,  political  stability,  citizens’  involvement  in  public 
decisions,  tax  law  transparency,  degree  in  which  citizens  receive  information  about  public  expenditures  and 
indicators, such as government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, control for corruption, weaving them 
into an attire of analytical insights meant to serve policy makers and inform laypeople. 
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1.  Introduction 
Asia has been standing in the spot light of history since the dawn of humanity, as being the source of the first 
people, civilizations, writing, languages, social structures, religious beliefs. Nowadays, Asia has started to regain a 
primary position in the limelight due to its countries’ economic revival achieved within the late years of 20
th century 
and early years of the 21
st. Triggered in the 1950s by the Japanese boom, the process of economic growth, registering 
average annual rates of 7-12 %, has spread gradually among the Four Tigers (i.e., Hong Kong, Singapore, South 
Korea, and Taiwan), then to China, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam. Authorities’ fiscal policies of 
boosting tax compliance levels, the manner of approaching taxpayers, as well as citizens’ perceptions and attitudes 
toward all these strategies seemed to have contributed to the Asian economic outburst. The various sides of tax 
compliance behavior are enclosed within a climate of interaction between citizens and tax authorities. In the tax 
literature, two dimensions are assumed to have a sound impact on people’s tax compliance behavior, i.e., trust in tax 
authorities and power of tax authorities. According to Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl (2008) [17], trust is deemed to 
represent taxpayers’ perceptions of authorities’ willingness to act in peoples’ interests, providing high quality public 
goods and services. Power is considered to embody taxpayers’ perceptions of authorities’ ability to efficiently catch 
and punish tax evaders. These two dimensions and their way of influencing each other determine the level and type 
of tax compliance, i.e., voluntary or enforced. It is implied that a high level of tax compliance can be attained by 
raising the level of trust and/or power. Voluntary compliance  is obtained through an increase in trust,  whereas 
enforced  compliance  is  reached  when  an  increase  in  power  takes  place.  One  of  the  most  common  methods  of 
empirically testing trust in and power of tax authorities and their enlacement is the survey based on the “slippery 
slope framework” (Kogler et al., 2013; Muehlbacher, Kirchler and Schwarzenberger, 2011; Muehlbacher, Kogler 
and Kirchler, 2012; Wahl, Kastlunger and Kirchler, 2010) [18]-[21]-[22]-[28]. To the best of our knowledge, there 
are no studies which measure the two dimensions captured in the “slippery slope” framework by means of diverse 
economic, political, financial or psychological proxies and particularize them to specific countries.  
The paper aims to close this gap by explaining taxpayers’ trust in authorities and their perceptions of authorities’ 
power with the help of socio-economic, financial, political, psychological proxies, in some eastern and southern 
Asian jurisdictions, i.e., China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Pakistan. In this regard, the study 
tackles several aspects, such as political regime, voice and accountability, political stability, citizens’ involvement in 
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public decisions, tax law transparency  and indicators, such as government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory 
quality,  control  for  corruption,  knitting  a  garment  of  analytical  assessments  concerning  trust  in  and  power  of 
authorities meant to serve policy makers and inform laypeople. The structure of the paper is the following: section 2 
presents an overview of Asian economic growth and tax systems, section 3 depicts the various aspects and indicators 
in relation to trust in and power of tax authorities in China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, Pakistan 
and section 4 offers a synthesis of conclusions and traces future avenues regarding the main topic of the article.    
  
2.  An Overview of Asian Economic Growth and Tax Systems  
Asia comprises 60% of the world human current population (with China and India summing 1/3 of the worldly 
citizens), covers 30% of the Earth total land area and on average 30% of the world GDP. Samuel Huntington (1997) 
[14] has foreseen that around year 2020, in a top five world economies Asia would be represented by four countries, 
whereas in a top ten world economies Asia would place seven countries. Moreover, he has stated that Asian GDP 
would represent around the same year, i.e., 2020, 40% of the world GDP. The data presented in figures 1 and 2, 
determined for the period starting in 2008 and ending in 2012 (hence, 8 years ahead of his predicted date) tend to 
confirm Huntington’s anticipations. Calculations were based on GDP (Nominal) and GDP (PPP) for a number of 42 
countries belonging to the Asian continent, across the five-year period. GDP (Nominal) is expressed in millions of 
US dollars, while GDP (PPP) in millions of international dollars. The ratio of Asian GDP to World GDP is denoted 
in parentheses.   
 
 
Figure 1. The evolution of Asian GDP (Nominal) with respect to  
World GDP (Nominal), 2008-2012  
Source: Authors’ computation based on World Bank Data (2008-2012) 
 
 
Figure 2. The evolution of Asian GDP (PPP) with respect to  
World GDP (PPP), 2008-2012 
Source: Authors’ computation based on World Bank Data (2008-2012) 
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One can notice that, if the Asian GDP as proportion of World GDP (both Nominal and PPP) continues to 
increase starting with 2012, we might find ourselves in the position of seeing Huntington’s previsions come true 
even sooner than 2020.    
Taking into account the pace and structure of economic growth, from the supply and demand perspective, the 
World Bank forestalls that China would become the largest economy in the world between 2020 and 2030 (Kuijs, 
2009) [20], whereas India is expected to enter top three largest economies by 2050 (Cayuela Valencia, 2013; Dadush 
and Stancil, 2010; PwC, 2013) [2]-[4]-[24]. For that matter, in a comprehensive analysis concerning the economic 
development of Asian countries, Kohli, Sharma and Sood (2011: 3) [19] advance a 40-year high-aimed agenda called 
the “Asian Century” presuming that, if the region maintains its current path, “by 2050 its per capita income could 
rise sixfold in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms to reach Europe’s levels today. It would make some 3 billion 
additional Asians affluent by current standards. BY nearly doubling its share of global gross domestic product (GDP) 
to 52 percent by 2050, Asia would regain the dominant economic position it held some 300 years ago, before the 
industrial revolution”. These predictions, which many could perceive as intrepid, are engendered by the conviction 
that some of the fast growing converging economies in Asia (especially China and India) have the potential to claim 
the first positions in the world provided they reinvent themselves and think ahead of times in terms of national, 
regional and global policies.  
To fully capture the global implications of such predictions, one should analyze in hindsight the combination of 
factors  which  have  yielded the current economic status.  As expert economist  Vito Tanzi notices in a  foreword 
tacking South and East Asian tax systems and reforms (Bernardi, Fraschini and Shome, 2006: xv-xx) [1], Asia’s 
prominent development (especially for the southern and eastern countries) has stemmed from several governments’ 
having the one-track mind of achieving economic growth. The aim set in the late 1970s has proven to be attainable, 
rooted in certainties like continuously growing population, massive urbanization and movement of labor capacities 
from agriculture to highly productive sectors like industry and trade. In the time span 1970-2005, the world trade 
share of Asian countries has doubled (Jaumotte et al., 2005) [15], making newly industrialized economies (e.g., 
Hong Kong, Japan) and developing economies (e.g., China, India) register striking performances. A key ingredient 
for such achievement was represented by the fiscal policies designed for granting considerable tax incentives in order 
to attract foreign investments. Compared to European countries which, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, registered 
taxation  to  GDP  ratios  of  about  40%,  Asian  governments  scored  between  20%  and  30%  in  the  same  period. 
Moreover,  as  Tanzi  emphasizes,  Asian  governments  have  been  generally  more  focused  on  allocation  than 
redistribution (favored by Europe) and have made no priority out of equity or taxpayers’ ability to pay their share. In 
fact, many of these governments have drawn low revenues from income or corporate taxes, thus providing light 
welfare  based  on  low  spending.  Another  explanation  for  this  low  welfare  provision  comes  from  the  fact  that, 
culturally speaking, enterprises and families have played an essential role on welfare by Asian tradition (Profeta and 
Scabrosetti, 2010: 49) [26]. The unraveling of the late 1990s financial crisis, which severely affected especially 
southeastern Asian countries, has stressed the shortcomings of scarce social protection systems.          
Compared to the OECD members, Asian countries have relied more on indirect taxation, proportional low tax 
rates and the absence of a social security  system.  Due to a quite low  fiscal burden, the Asian labor force has 
experienced few work constraints or incentives of hiding in the informal sector because of high taxation. Hence, the 
employment rate has been relatively high.    
Nowadays, the features of the Asian tax systems have not changed drastically compared to the early 2000s. 
Asian countries are accounted as jurisdictions with the lowest tax burdens in the world, levying  weak personal 
income, property tax or social contributions. Direct taxation has still not won the influence battle against indirect 
taxation,  and  the  tax  systems  are  perceived  as  inefficient  because  of  low  or  unaccomplished  levels  of  fiscal 
decentralization (Park, 2012) [23].      
Some  of  the  key  factors  which  have  contributed  greatly  to  Asia’s  economic  rise  are  fast  urbanization,  tax 
incentivized  foreign  investments  and  extensive  use  of  natural  and  human  resources.  Nevertheless,  the  notable 
economic results have not been secured without a toll and costs which in the past might have gone unnoticed could 
hinder  future  growth.  Mishandled  urbanization  process,  rising  corruption,  sharpening  income  inequality  among 
citizens and broadening economic development gaps between countries in the region, shortage of proper governance 
and transparency, diminishing government credibility, loose institutional capacity, lack of a supra-national authority 
to coordinate policies, the middle income trap menacing emerging economies, all of the above might put a stop to the 
current growth momentum (Bernardi et al., 2006; Kohli et al., 2011) [1]-[19]-[51]. 
For the goal of the “Asian century” to be reached within the specified period, Asian leadership should ponder 
their  decisions,  permanently  adjust  policies  and  strategies  to  meet  global  trends,  slightly  shift  from  economies 
focused solely on growth to economies stimulating social well-being, increase trust levels at national and regional 
level and, last but not least, meliorate citizens’ perceptions of governing power by increasing transparency and 
accountability.              
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Starting from the indicators assessed by the Paying Taxes 2014 report [25], we computed the regional average 
on 40 Asian countries  for each indicator and then compared it to the world average. The next figure plots the 
indicators considered: Total Tax Rate (TTR), Number of Payments (NP) and Number of Hours (NH), representing 
the time to comply. 
 
Figure 3. World and Asia averages for Paing Taxes Indicators 2014  
(i.e., TTR, NP, NH) 
Source: Authors’ computation based on Paying Taxes 2014 Report  
 
Since 2004 until 2012, the global averages for all three indicators has fallen, due to an array of improvements 
operated in the majority of countries at different levels of their tax systems. According to our calculations, the Asian 
averages follow this trend, though remaining close to the world averages. The time needed to comply expands over a 
wide range, from 12 hours in UAE to 872 in Vietnam. The smallest number of tax payments is found in Hong Kong 
and Saudi Arabia (3), UAE (4), Singapore (5), while the biggest number of tax payments is encountered in Tajikistan 
(69), Sri Lanka (58), Kyrgyzstan (51), Indonesia (52), Pakistan (47), Yemen (44), Uzbekistan (41). The highest Total 
Tax Rates are registered in Uzbekistan (99.3), Tajikistan (86), China (63.7), India (62.8), the lowest Total Tax Rates 
are found in countries like Qatar (11.3), Kuwait (12.4), Bahrain (13.5), United Arab Emirates (14.4), Saudi Arabia 
(14.5). 
PwC (2014) [25] report offers some explanations regarding the evolution of indicators in the Asian economies 
between 2004 and 2012. The introduction and development of electronic filing systems and their adoption by the 
taxpayers has triggered a fall in the number of payments until 2012. The outlier is China with a decrease of 28 
payments,  followed  by  India  22,  Malaysia  22  and  the  Philippines  12.  Indonesia,  China,  Lao  PDR  have  also 
undertook substantial measures of diminishing the time to comply by over 300 hours. The tax system development in 
the Republic of Korea during all these years has engendered a reduction of time to comply by 20 hours. Indonesia 
simplified tax filing and extended the use of electronic systems, while Sri Lanka continues to make important steps 
toward generalizing the online filing system for all taxes. One might single out Tajikistan, where two thirds of 
payments represent “other taxes” and no electronic filing system is used so far. In recent years, tax authorities have 
been  making  efforts  to  reform  the  tax  systems  and  apply  new  practices.  For  instance,  Uzbekistan  has  started 
implementing reforms to the administration of assessment and potential underpayments. China, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
stand out for abating the profit tax rates. It is worth noticing that states like Singapore or Thailand carry out measures 
of  simplifying  tax  collection  systems,  administering  international  best  fiscal  practices  and  improving  tax 
transparency. The low values of the indicators attained by Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and United Arab 
Emirates are explained firstly by the low number of taxes levied in this region, and secondly by their endeavors to 
adhere to a regional tax treaty network and to regulate the legislation introducing compulsory e-filing and e-payment 
for taxes. These Middle East countries have the lowest average Total Tax Rate (with approximately 20% below the 
world average) and the lowest time to comply (with approximately 41% below the world average).    
 
3.  Trust  in  and  Power  of  Tax  Authorities  in  China,  Hong  Kong  SAR,  India,  Japan, 
Republic of Korea, Pakistan 
  The Asian jurisdictions considered for the subsequent analyses focused on trust in and power of authorities are 
China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Japan, Republic of Korea and Pakistan. The selection is based on several criteria 
including economic performance, development level and visibility in the region, but also other relevant aspects like 
the type of ruling power or demographic trends. These jurisdictions are of significant importance in the region, 
mainly because they are counted among the fastest growing economies in the world. One could add that, to a large 
degree, they pace development as well for other Asian countries. If during the 1970s and 1980s, Japan and Korea 
were commended as newly industrialized economies, the late 2000s conceded China and India a similar status. Data 
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released by the World Bank concerning the GDP (Nominal) for year 2012 put China and Japan on the second and 
third position, followed by India (10
th), Korea (15
th), Hong Kong (37
th) and Pakistan (44
th), out of 190 jurisdictions. 
As for the GDP (PPP), China, India and Japan rank 2
nd, 3
rd and 4
th respectively, succeeded by Korea (12
th), Pakistan 
(26
th) and Hong Kong (36
th) [31]. The regional (and global) importance of these jurisdictions is heightened by the 
ascending demographic trend to which Pakistan and primary India will contribute a great deal in the upcoming 30 
years [50].  
Their successful story of economic growth ensured up till now by very distinct  forms of governance (e.g., 
autocracy, democracy, monarchy) could imply that concepts like trust in authorities and power of authorities may be 
perceived slightly different here than in western countries.             
  Described as citizens’ perceptions regarding authorities’ disposition to work for the sake, safety and benefit of 
people  and  authorities’  ability  to  chase,  catch  and  punish  evaders,  respectively,  trust  and  power  could  be  best 
understood, captured, measured and explained in a broader context defined by aspects concerning political regime, 
voice  and  accountability,  political  stability,  citizens’  involvement  in  public  decisions,  tax  law  transparency  and 
indicators such as government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, control for corruption. 
    
 3.1. Aspects regarding Political Regime, Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Citizens’ 
Involvement in Public Decisions   
People’s Republic of China is a sovereign state with a moderate socialist regime which exercises jurisdiction on 
22  provinces,  five  autonomous  regions,  four  municipalities  and  two  special  administrative  regions.  China’s 
Constitution stipulates the opportunity of organizing referenda, but the legislation concerning this issue is obstructed 
in order not to generate unwanted results for the socialist regime. The president is the sole person who can call for 
referendum  in  times  of  major  crisis.  Since  1996,  The  World  Bank  has  been  determining  annually  The  World 
Governance Indicators (WGI), covering 200 countries and territories. Voice and accountability (VA) and political 
stability  (PS)  are  among  the  six  dimensions  measured.  The  indicator  Voice  and  Accountability  depicts  the 
perceptions regarding people’s ability to elect a government, their freedom to associate, to express and the media 
freedom  (Kaufmann,  Kraay  and  Mastruzzi,  2010)  [16].  The  indicator  Political  Stability  and  Absence  of 
Violence/Terrorism describes the perceptions regarding the possibility of replacing a government through actions of 
violence or terrorism (Kaufmann et al., 2010) [16]. In 2012, China’s rank concerning VA was 5, on a scale from 0 
(“least accountable”) to 100 (“most accountable”), whereas China’s rank concerning PS was 28, on a scale from 0 
(“least stable”) to 100 (“the most stable”). The low VA and PS rankings are particularly due to the political regime 
which strictly supervises the activity in all areas of social life.    
Hong Kong SAR is a special administrative region of China, run by a governor. Democratic elections are used to 
designate 50% of the Legislative Council’s members, the other 50% being elected by the business environment 
representatives. Its Constitution, the Hong Kong Basic Law, provides a high autonomy degree of all sectors, except 
for foreign relations and national defense. The Constitution does not stipulate organizing referenda. According to 
WGI, in 2012 Hong Kong ranked 67 on VA and 80 on PS. As a consequence for enjoying a lot of freedom in almost 
all sectors, Hong Kong positioned high both when it comes to VA and PS. One can notice that, when compared to 
China, Hong Kong’s higher VA and PS positions denote improvement in terms of openness, accountability and 
freedom.    
India is a federal parliamentary constitutional republic with the most complex multi-party system (six national 
parties and over 40 regional parties) and a federal government which supervises the activities of the governments in 
its 28 states and seven union territories. The Constitution of India doesn’t explicitly envisage the calling of referenda 
as a means of identifying citizens’ opinion on legislative issues [43]-[38]-[41]. In 2012, WGI places India relative to 
VA and PS on the 58
th position and 12
th position, respectively. While the high value of VA can be attributed to the 
democratic government interested and actively involved in promoting a thriving socio-economic climate, the PS 
value is mostly a cause of different territorial disputes.  
Japan is a parliamentary constitutional monarchy with a democratically elected legislature. The Prime Minister 
and members of the Diet (Japanese government - “Kokkai”) are endowed with the highest level of authority, while 
the Emperor, holding limited power, is enshrined as a sacred symbol of the state. Stretched along its 6,852 islands 
organized in 47 prefectures, the nation of the rising sun  is governed according to its 1947 Constitution,  which 
stipulates that the sovereign power resides in people’s hands (Article 1) and the Diet can call referenda (Article 96) 
[39]. The country ranked 83 in terms of VA and 78 in terms of PS. These high placements represent a sign that the 
“three arrows”, i.e., bold monetary measures, fiscal stimulus, structural reforms, are efficiently spearheaded by the 
Japanese Prime Minister through his Abenomics policy (the portmanteau word of Shinzo Abe and economics).   
The Republic of Korea is a presidential constitutional republic comprising 17 provinces. After the separation 
from North Korea in 1948, the political situation was tensioned, being characterized by several coups d’état and 
military dictatorships, especially during 1960s and 1980s. The end of 1980s brought the beginning of a democratic 
era, thus nowadays the Republic of Korea represents a stable democracy. The Constitution of the country provides 
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that the President can submit problems regarding national defense, diplomacy, unification, economy or other aspects 
to a national referendum [33]. According to WGI 2012, its VA is 70, as a consequence of the high socio-economic 
development and its PS is 52, chiefly as an effect of ongoing menaces from North Korea.       
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a federal parliamentary republic, divided in four provinces and four federal 
territories, representing the second biggest Islamic country in terms of population (after Indonesia). In seven decades 
bygone  since the separation  from India, the political  situation in Pakistan  has been  marked by a continuum of 
instability, vacillating between military dictatorship and sporadic democratic governments [46]. Notwithstanding 
this, at least theoretically, the Constitution envisages direct inquiring of the citizens and calling for referenda at the 
initiative of the Prime Minister who needs Parliament’s approval [47]. WGI 2012 displays rankings of 24 for VA and 
1 for PS. The continuous socio-political instability, the lack of a strong leadership concerned with citizens’ wellbeing 
and society’s prosperity, and the absence of a sound opposition capable of managing accountability of the leaders are 
all possible explanations for the VA and PS low rankings.           
 
3.2. Tax Systems and Tax Law Transparency  
  In China, the fiscal year starts on January 1
st and ends December 31
st, as in the majority of European countries. 
The category of individual taxpayers comprises residents, who can be: 1) citizens domiciled in China (holding a 
Chinese passport); 2) non-domiciled foreign nationals who live “in China for 365 days, without a single period of 
absence of more than 30 days consecutively or cumulative periods of absence of more than 90 days within the same 
calendar year” [40]. Tax legislation changes frequently, hence taxpayers have to make substantial efforts in keeping 
themselves up to date and complying, considering the legislation stipulates drastic sanctions for tax evasion acts. 
With regards to the business environment regulation process, 77% of Chinese citizens deemed in 2012 that it was 
insufficiently regulated by the Beijing government [11]. Wages and salaries are taxed progressively with rates from 
3% to 45%, while personal service income tax can reach 40%. Businesses are subject to a standard tax rate of 25%, 
though it can vary depending on the activity sector (e.g., small-scale enterprises 20%; high-tech 15%). Investors are 
granted a manifold of incentives: a 15% preferential tax for new high-tech companies and a 50% deduction for R&D 
expenditures; high-tech businesses started in 2008 get also a two-year tax holiday and a three-year period of 12.5% 
tax; a 15% tax reduction while investing in western China; tax exemptions for sectors like agriculture, forestry, 
software, major infrastructure projects (Deloitte, 2013) [5]. Consumption is taxed by VAT rates of 6%, 11% and 
standard 17%.     
  Among the positive aspect of the Chinese tax system, one can notice: the low number of payments a company 
has to make to the state budget during the fiscal year (i.e., seven); the possibility to pay once four types of taxes and 
mandatory contributions; high number of taxpayers who use the electronic filing system to submit tax returns and 
pay fiscal obligations; levying a single tax on each tax basis (i.e., avoiding double taxation) (PwC, 2014) [25].     The 
Chinese government informs its citizens about the structure of the state budget. The country’s law of obtaining 
information about the public and private sector is very strict and ambiguous in the same time. Only the state has a 
lawful  mandate  to  investigate  public  and  private  companies,  with  the  possibility  of  declaring  illegal  (even 
retrospectively) any attempt of data collection. In China, no company is allowed to sell private information to other 
company, hence due diligence business-like is illegal. The alternative highly used by Chinese and foreign companies 
is guanxi, a traditional social network system for obtaining information and benefits.                
  In Hong Kong SAR, the fiscal year begins on the 1
st of April and ends the 31
st of March. Residents are subject to 
low progressivity (2%-17%), but the lack of taxes on capital acquisitions, inheritance, estate or net wealth makes all 
the difference. Investors benefit also from a low fiscal burden: profit tax is 16.5%, they are exempt from dividend or 
capital gains taxes and offshore funds are not liable for taxation, if certain conditions are satisfied. Hong Kong is a 
true paradise for shoppers, as it does not levy VAT (Deloitte, 2013) [6]. Being a tax haven which grants incentives to 
non-residents, the vibrant city draws annually billions of dollars from the whole world. During last two years, capital 
inflows have dampened because of the campaign against tax evasion launched by several governments. To avoid 
being labeled as uncooperative tax haven by the OECD, authorities from Hong Kong have signed various disclosure 
agreements and double tax treatises. With respect to tax compliance costs, authorities have secured the highest 
efficiency: economic agents have to make the lowest number of payments to the state budget, namely three (PwC, 
2014) [25]. In terms of business environment, 61% of Hong Kong residents believe it is not regulated enough (ETB, 
2012) [11].    
  Korean fiscal year marks its beginning on the 1
st of January and its ending on the 31
st of December. In order to 
incentivize voluntary tax compliance, Korean authorities have mitigated since 2010 the administrative burden of 
filing returns by refining the online application, merging several local taxes, approving the aggregate payment with 
respect to four types of taxes and labor contributions. A notable result following the improvement of the online tax 
payment  application  has  been  the  decrease  in  the  total  compliance  time  (PwC,  2014)  [25].  Moreover,  Korean 
authorities show high interest in stimulating investments by granting tax exempts in several areas (especially IT). 
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Korean employees are subject to progressive taxation of up to 41.8%, including the local surtax. Businessmen are 
also required to pay rates of 10%, 12% or 22%, depending on the taxable income value. Moreover, they benefit from 
several exemptions and tax credit opportunities. Goods and services are taxed by a 10% standard VAT (Deloitte, 
2013) [7]. Referring to legislation, survey show that 45% of Korean citizens believe the market is insufficiently 
regulated by the government (ETB, 2012) [11]. The government of Korea is accountable when it comes to the use of 
public money [45], even though the country is assessed as “partially free by the organization Freedom House [36].        
  Yearly, Indian taxpayers begin their fiscal obligations on the 1
st of April and end them on the 31
st of March. An 
important characteristic of the tax system in India is the distribution of fiscal powers and responsibilities regarding 
budgetary expenditures among federal and state governmental authorities. The tax law is designed at the federal 
government level, but its prerogatives are not applied ad litteram across member states. The settlement of new tax 
levies belongs exclusively to the prerogatives of the legislative power. Indian tax system is grounded on a very 
intricate legislation and a high number of levies. According to Cussons (2007) [3], the country ranks first in terms of 
regulations with a total number of 9,000 pages of basic tax law. Despite this, 47% of the citizens believe the business 
environment lacks regulations. An element which enhances law intricacy is the fact that taxes can be imposed both 
by the federal and state governments, without a perfect coordination of legislation and administrative practices (e.g., 
notable differences between tax bases, tax rates, etc.). Hence, tax authorities interpret laws with a certain freedom. 
Notwithstanding  this,  to  mitigate  the  administrative  burden  generated  by  its  legislation,  Indian  authorities  have 
implemented electronic filing of tax returns, including for consumption taxes. The strategy has proven extremely 
efficient, with consumption tax time diminishing from 113 to 105 hours (PwC, 2014) [25]. Indians employees pay 
income tax in progressive rates up to 30% plus cess, while businesses are subject to rates of 30% (if domestic) and 
40% (if foreign) plus surtax and cess. Consumption taxes are relatively new for the Indian market (1
st of April 2005) 
and it comprise of a 4%-5% general rate and a 12%-15% residual rate, varying across states (Deloitte, 2013) [8].          
  Information on the activity of the federal government is shared with the citizens on an average delay of 18 
months. Generally, the emphasis is on the federal budget and its fiscal deficit. Data regarding budgetary outlays and 
the financial situation of Indian states are not available.  
  Japanese tax levies are collected from the beginning of April 1
st until March 31
st. Individual taxpayers are 
divided into three categories: 1) non-residents, namely people that have lived in the country for less than one year 
and reside elsewhere; 2) non-permanent residents, or people who lived in the country below five years but without 
the intention of living there permanently; 3) permanent residents, i.e., people who either have lived in the country for 
five years or intend to live there permanently [44]. According to the National Tax Agency, the income tax system is 
based on a combination of self-assessment and withholding systems. Personal tax rates can be rather steep, reaching 
progressively a 50% threshold. Year 2013 brought an additional 2.1% tax meant to cover massive losses after the 
Fukushima  nuclear  disaster.  The  positive  outcomes  of  the  Abenomics  policy  have  been  felt  so  far  mostly  by 
businesses, because the effective corporate tax rate has dropped from 41% to 38%. In order to balance the massive 
fiscal stimulus granted in 2013, VAT is being increased from 55 to 8% in April 2014 and later to 10% (Deloitte, 
2013) [9]. The efficiency of the Japanese collecting process is enhanced by the online application for tax returns 
submission.  
In Pakistan, there are two types of fiscal years: 1) calendar year (July 1
st-June 30
th) and the special fiscal year 
(approved by authorities). The category of individual taxpayers comprises all residents who live in the country for 
183 days or more in that tax year, while corporate taxpayers refers to all economic agents registered on the grounds 
of the Pakistani law or which have a management and control team located entirely in the country. With respect to 
individuals, the tax code states that any resident obtaining a yearly taxable income above PKR 400,000 is expected to 
pay her share, in progressive rates from 5% to 10%. Self-employed are subject to rates ascending from 10% to 25%, 
corporate tax rate is set at 35%, while goods and services are taxed by 16% [Deloitte, 2013] [10]. On the account of 
increasing the tax rate for small economic entities, tax compliance level dropped in the last two years. Information 
concerning the federal government’s activity, total public debt and budgetary outlays reach the citizens with a large 
delay. Data on tax expenditures are revealed only to members of the federal or regional government [37].  
 
3.3. Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control for Corruption     
According to our view, a suitable path for measuring trust in authorities and power of authorities is by using the 
World  Governance  Indicators  (developed  annually  by  the  World  Bank)  as  proxies:  Government  Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control for Corruption. The first indicator, Government Effectiveness (GE), 
encompasses the perceptions related to the quality of public goods and services, civil service and the extent to which 
this  service  is  free  from  political  influences,  quality  of  implemented  governmental  strategies  and  government’s 
commitment towards such strategies (Kaufmann et al., 2010) [16]. Regulatory Quality (RQ) includes the perceptions 
concerning authorities’ capacity to implement efficient policies that stimulate private sector growth. Rule of Law 
(RL) contains the perceptions about the  extent to which citizens comply with the laws of a society, relative to 
contract enforcement, property rights, security and judicial system, probability of crime and violence. Control for 
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Corruption (CC) comprises the degree to which public power is used as a means of obtaining personal benefits (i.e., 
petty and grand corruption) and the extent to which power is controlled by elites and private interests. As one can 
easily notice, this set of aggregate indicators deal with perceptions, concepts belonging to the psychological realm, 
with social dimensions, with economic and financial data, political constructs and legislative prescriptions.  
The following figures depict the evolution of GE, RQ, RL and CC for China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Japan, 
Republic of Korea and Pakistan, spanning an eleven-year period from 2002 to 2012. On country basis, for each 
indicator we retrieved the yearly percentile rank among all countries, ranging from 0 (lowest rank) to 100 (highest 
rank).               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 4. Evolution of Government Effectiveness              Figure 5. Evolution of Regulatory Quality 
              Source: World Bank Data (2008-2012)                             Source: World Bank Data (2008-2012)   
 
  Starting from the theory behind the development of GE and RQ, we concluded that these aggregate indicators 
relate to the trust in authorities dimension stipulated by the “slippery slope” framework (Kirchler et al., 2008) [17], 
which is said to increase tax compliance level, particularly voluntary tax compliance. High levels of trust generally 
go hand in hand with economic prosperity, increased compliance, state of the art public goods and services, high 
levels of well-being. With regards to the analyzed countries, Hong Kong SAR and Pakistan are the opposite outliers. 
Hong Kong SAR registers the highest levels in both GE and RQ, while Pakistan scores the lowest GE and RQ.  
  In the case of Hong Kong SAR, indicators often have reached the maximum scale due to its status of highly 
developed jurisdiction, with cutting edge technology, a thriving economy, booming financial sector and “tax haven” 
label. These results are in line with the Quality of Life Index 2013 developed by Economist Intelligence Unit, which 
considers Hong Kong the 10
th best place to live in [30]. The data follows the same trend as the Human Development 
Index 2013, according to which Hong Kong ranks 13
th in the world and falls in the category of “very high human 
development” (UNDP, 2013) [27]. At the other end, Pakistan’s plunging scores denote low quality public goods and 
poor economic performance, compared to the other five jurisdictions. The “low human development” insured by the 
government to the Pakistani citizens triggers also low trust and mitigates tax compliance levels.            
  In spite of the economic growth momentum, overall market optimism and massive infrastructure investment, 
China’s rankings confirm its “developing country” status, scoring lower than its developed Asian competitors (i.e., 
Japan and Korea). The country still has to improve the quality of public goods and services, as currently it ranks 
101
st among countries with “medium human development”. Such progress will yield high trust in authorities and 
more tax revenues in the state budget.            
India follows the same trends like China, scoring lower with respect to government effectiveness and regulatory 
quality. The country faces a major trust roadblock and plunging tax compliance, as citizens become aware of the 
government’s  diminishing  capacity  to  provide  governance  and  high  quality  public  services.  Instead,  media  is 
perceived as fundamental hub and upholder of public accountability due to the manifold of topics targeting ordinary 
people, from public corruption, crimes against women to natural resources (ETB, 2013) [12]. In terms of human 
development, India is the 136
th country in the world, belonging to the category of “medium human development”.       
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                   Figure 6. Evolution of Rule of Law                           Figure 7. Evolution of Control for Corruption 
               Source: World Bank Data (2008-2012)                                     Source: World Bank Data (2008-2012)   
 
The  power  of  authorities  dimension  comprised  in  the  “slippery  slope”  framework  is  connected  with  the 
indicators RL and CC. Taxpayers perceive authorities as powerful if they are able and committed to apply the law 
following its letter and spirit, without following any personal interests, and to efficiently catch evaders.       
According to figures 6 and 7, jurisdictions group in two major clusters based on RL and CC ranks: Hong Kong 
SAR, Korea and Japan, representing the developed ones, using more efficient anti-evasion strategies; China, India 
and Pakistan, as developing, still requiring improvement in this area. With the exception of Hong Kong, where there 
are no (or few) incentives for committing tax evasion, the tax laws in most of these countries state various sanctions 
for noncompliance.  
Authorities  from  Hong  Kong  may  be  investigating  less  tax  evasion,  but  they  have  a  zero  tolerance  for 
corruption. If 40 years ago it was viewed as one of the most corrupt cities in the world, currently it almost cleaned 
the phenomenon through punishment, education and prevention policies. In order to stamp out tax evasion and 
enforce compliance, Korean authorities use sanctions (penalties and/or imprisonment), disclosure agreements with 
other countries and monitor offshore activities through a special unit of the National Tax Service (NTS). Until now, 
the company Hyundai has received the most staggering tax evasion penalty of 136 billion won (120 million dollars) 
for tax evasion and illegal share transactions [49].  
In the developing cluster, India and Pakistan face severe tax evasion, because tax authorities are inefficient in 
implementing monitoring strategies and noncompliance sanctions are rarely inflicted. By far, China has the harshest 
sanctions against tax evasion, from a daily interest of 0.05% for unpaid tax, fines between 50%-500% to death 
penalty.           
In many situations, tax evasion acts are also tainted by corruption, which corrodes authorities’ power in the 
collective mind and makes them seem vulnerable to any incentives. Along with country governments, international 
bodies are also involved in mitigating fraud and corruption through various practices, including financial and non-
financial  disincentives  (“naming  and  shaming”).  For  instance,  the  World  Bank  lists  on  its  website  names  of 
individuals and firms sanctioned for fraud and/or corruption and declared ineligible to obtain future grants for an 
indicated period (“provisional” or “permanent” ban). Except for Japan, all the other five countries are represented in 
this list [52].  
   
4.  Conclusions 
  Using a variety of economic, social, political, psychological proxies, including indicators developed by the 
World Bank Group for the period 2002-2012, we explained trust in authorities and power of authorities, two main 
dimensions captured by the “slippery slope” framework, in six eastern and southern Asian countries, as following: 
China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Japan, Republic of Korea and Pakistan. Analyses denoted that countries scoring 
closer to the 100 maximum scale for all indicators (government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control 
for corruption) are generally developed, host citizens who trust tax authorities and perceive them as powerful and 
efficient, and consequently register higher tax revenues due to increased compliance. Lower country score ranks 
characterize developing jurisdictions with less trust in and power of authority, rampant tax evasion and corruption 
and less tax compliance.        
  During the last three years, the mass of tax reforms operated in Asian countries have been mainly focused on 
increasing compliance by introducing or improving electronic tax filing systems. Furthermore, starting with 2013, a 
shift in citizens’ expectations has been registered. While the private sector is called to make changes in the social 
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environments where companies operate, create value, obtain profit, support the elaboration of public policies and 
regulations,  improve  and  develop  community  living  standards,  government’s  sole  onus  is  to  continue  offering 
protection (ETB, 2013) [12].  
  Considering recent developments in tax behavior, Russian authorities stand out for making compliance easier on 
earth and beyond, with the newly implemented “Taxpayer Personal Office for Individuals” online portal. In 2013, 
Russian astronaut Pavel Vinogradov, who was orbiting Earth at an altitude of 386 kilometers as member of the 
International Space Station, became the first taxpayer to ever pay taxes from space. He voluntarily complied with 
regards to his earthly income, but luckily for him the per diem value he received for exploring space was tax free. 
This cutting edge performance shows noncompliant earthlings that it becomes more difficult to avoid the scrutinizing 
eye of the tax man and the power of tax authorities, even in space [25]-[35]-[48]. 
Businesses in 121 countries surveyed by the World Bank deem tax rates as one of the first five hindrances of 
their activity and tax administration as one of the first eleven. These findings mirror reality, inasmuch as studies 
show that an increase by one percent in total tax rate generates an increase by three percent in tax evasion (Fisman 
and Wei, 2004) [13]. Moreover, the intricacy of tax administration is expected to fuel shadow economy and to put a 
damper on general trust, investment decisions and economic growth. In order to mend fiscal policies, heighten public 
accountability, improve tax compliance behavior and eventually attain an interaction tax climate of mutual trust, joint 
efforts from all parties involved in the interaction are claimed. Accordingly, authorities are called to make efforts for 
streamlining the administrative apparatus, mitigating time to comply, level as well as number of taxes and easing tax 
payment systems (PwC, 2014: 10) [25], individuals behind the veil of tax authorities must be held responsible for 
their decisions, media has to be independent from political influences and to uprightly report grant corruption and 
evasion cases, citizens need full access to information concerning public expenditures and the freedom to give voice 
to  their  discontent  in  the  absence  of  transparent  procedures  of  tax  levying  and  wealth  redistribution.  These 
approaches shore up the pillars of democracy meant (as its etymology suggests) to empower taxpayers who, in turn, 
enhance their trust in authorities’ power to assist and support them and to work for the general wellbeing.  
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